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PREVENTING BILLIONS FROM BEING WASHED 
OFFSHORE: A GROWING APPROACH TO 
STOPPING INTERNATIONAL DRUG 
TRAFFICKING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has expended vast amounts of money and 
resources in trying to eradicate drug trafficking. 1 Despite these ef-
forts, drug trafficking has steadily increased,2 prompting the U.S. 
Government to predict that in 1986, Americans would spend more 
than $100 billion for illegal drugs. 3 
Many of the approaches to stopping the growth of the drug 
problem have been based on two conflicting theories centered 
around supply and demand concepts. The United States, in sup-
porting a supply-based approach, has aimed many of its drug pro-
grams toward the eradication of the narcotics trade, mainly in ma-
rijuana, cocaine and heroin, at the source, mostly Third World 
countries.4 The drug-producing countries, however, advocate a de-
mand-oriented solution where the objective is to wipe out demand 
by rehabilitating drug users, thus eliminating the need for the 
supply.6 
A third solution is now emerging, one that focuses on another 
aspect of trafficking that controls both supply and demand -
money. Government officials are realizing that the lure of huge 
cash profits keeps the drug world well-populated and economically 
secure. 6 Therefore, the development of law enforcement tools to 
1. For an excellent discussion of the different U.S. approaches to fighting drugs and 
their ineffectiveness, see generally Note, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics Control: 
Slamming the Stable Door After the Horse Has Bolted, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 353 
(1984). 
2. Opium production has tripled since 1984, to 120 tons during 1985-86, while heroin 
production has increased 10 times in the same period. U.N. Report Links Drugs, Arms, 
Traffic, and Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at B7, col. 4. 
3. Drug Eradication Act of 1986, H.R. 5484, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 532(a)(2), 132 CONG. 
REc. 11,219 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986). 
4. This is mainly accomplished through crop substitution in source countries. Note, 
supra note 1, at 404-06. 
5. B. FREEMANTLE, THE FIX 30 (1985). 
6. Official annual estimates of drug-related profits in the United States range from $20 
billion to $90 billion. Strasser, Hiding Money Gets Tougher, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 3, 1986, at 46, 
col. 2. A former money launderer who became a government informer testified to laundering 
$100,000 a day in Miami for a major drug dealer. The dealer had approximately six to eight 
other people working as daily launderers. Tax Evasion, Drug Trafficking, and Money Laun-
dering as They Involve Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial 
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Fi-
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attack the illegal profits of drug trafficking can be more effective 
than trying to regulate the source or the market for drugs. 7 Seizing 
a drug operation's profits and assets has proven to be more effec-
tive in shutting down the operation than simply putting the traf-
ficker in jail. 8 
In an attempt to help law enforcement officials in this area, 
Congress recently passed the Money Laundering Control Act,9 
which makes the laundering of money a separate federal crime. 
The new law is directly aimed at a drug trafficker's Achilles' heel. 
In order to enjoy the enormous cash proceeds of illegal drug deals 
and to escape detection, a trafficker must clandestinely transform 
the dirty cash into a clean form of wealth.10 
One way to clean illicit cash is to set up a legitimate cash busi-
ness through which the illegal profits can be channelled and re-
ported as legal income derived from the business. This, however, is 
considered a risky method. 11 Given the huge income a drug dealer 
can make, reports of such abnormally high profits for a legitimate 
business usually raise the suspicions of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice and state law enforcement officials.12 In addition, businesses 
typically used for laundering activities are well known and docu-
mented.13 Therefore, money laundering cannot succeed unless it is 
conducted behind an impenetrable veil of secrecy. 
In recent years, foreign jurisdictions offering business and 
bank secrecy laws have created a formidable legal wall behind 
nance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86 (1986) [hereinafter Money Laundering 
Hearings]. 
7. "The drug business will stop when they can't get anybody to do anything with the 
money." Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 6, at 76. No matter how many members 
of a drug organization are arrested, be they "lieutenants" or the major l~aders, there are 
always others to continue operations. However, if officials can seize the assets and property 
of the group, then the organization is rendered impotent. Id. at 854-55 (statement of Alwin 
C. Coward, Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency). 
8. See Nantucket Land Seized, Roxbury Cash Escapes, Boston Globe, Sept. 29, 1985, 
at 20, col. 1. The article compares two drug investigations, one of which "gave priority to 
choking the drug flow, not seizing the property." While investigators were able to indict 
seven members of the drug ring, the assets of a $10 million operation are still missing. The 
other investigation followed the dealer through "public documents and financial records in 
the United States and abroad" and succeeded in "not only dismantling his drug ring but in 
capturing its profits." Id. 
9. 18 u.s.c. § 1956 (1986). 
10. Comment, Piercing Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal Narcotics 
Profits: The Cayman Islands Example, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 133, 136-37 (1985). 
11. Id. at 137. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. These businesses include savings and loan institutions, casinos, construction 
companies and small restaurants. Id. 
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which a majority of drug traffickers can launder their illegal pro-
ceeds. I• Some estimates indicate that as much as 75 percent of all 
sophisticated drug trafficking involves the use of offshore secrecy 
havens.15 
One such haven that has been used extensively by drug traf-
fickers is the Cayman Islands. Ia This British colony is located · 460 
miles southwest of Miami with a population of 17,000.I7 The Cay-
man Islands has been considered one of the most difficult secrecy 
jurisdictions for U.S. authorities investigating drug trafficking/ 
money laundering activities to penetrate. Is A combination of this 
reputation for ironclad secrecy, convenient geographic location and 
an economic climate that has encouraged financial activity, has 
made the Cayman Islands an international money laundering 
center.I9 
This situation is changing, however, due to recent U.S. pres-
sure and a serious effort by the Cayman Islands Government to 
avoid drug money.20 In 1986, the United States and the Cayman 
Islands signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) 2I regard-
ing criminal matters, which will provide the parties, and ultimately 
the international community, with an effective tool in combatting 
the menace of drug trafficking. 
This Note will first discuss how a drug trafficker launders 
money through a secrecy haven such as the Cayman Islands in or-
der to avoid U.S. laws and regulations on money laundering. Sec-
ond, this Note will examine the development of U.S. law regarding 
money laundering, with emphasis on the need to access evidence 
from foreign secrecy jurisdictions regarding the financial transac-
tions and accounts involved. Third, this Note will look at the vari-
ous methods the United States has used to reach this extraterrito-
14. PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AF-
FAIRS, CRIME AND SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES, S. REP. No. 130, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) [hereinafter CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT]. 
15. Weiland, The Use of Offshore Institutions to Facilitate Criminal Activity in the 
United States, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 1115, 1118 (1984). 
16. CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, supra note 14, at 76. 
17. Comment, supra note 10, at 134-36. 
18. Id. at 77. 
19. Id. at 80. "One IRS official estimated $3 billion [of] criminal moneys flow there 
annually; one Justice official estimated up to $10 billion illicitly flows there each year. Such 
figures [however] are unsubstantiated." Id. at 83. 
20. Id. at 76. 
21. Cayman Islands Treaty Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 
July 3, 1986, United States-United Kingdom-Northern Ireland, _ U.S.T. _, T.I.A.S. 
No. _(not yet in force) [hereinafter Cayman Islands Treaty]. 
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rial evidence, especially in connection with the Cayman Islands. 
Fourth, this Note will analyze the use of the new treaty between 
the United States and the Cayman Islands as a tool for money 
laundering investigators. Fifth, a comparison will be made between 
the treaty and other extraterritorial methods to show that the 
treaty offers the best legal approach for the international commu-
nity to take in fighting the growing problem of drug money laun-
dering. Finally, this Note will conclude that a combination of do-
mestic legislation and international judicial assistance can become 
the most effective system for combatting the international drug 
trafficker, whose motivation and security are derived only from the 
billions of dollars to be made in the trade. 
II. THE USE OF OFFSHORE SECRECY HAVENS BY 
DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO 
STOP THE PROCESS 
A. THE SHIELD OF SECRECY AND A TRAFFICKER'S USE OF OFFSHORE 
HAVENS 
The legal prototype of a secrecy jurisdiction was developed in 
Switzerland during the 1930's22 as a response to the German Nazi 
Government's attempts to seize the assets of Jews who were either 
fleeing the holocaust or had been annihilated by it. 23 Since then, 
secrecy havens have been created through banking and business 
laws in jurisdictions all over the world.24 The Cayman Islands en-
acted their first bank secrecy law in 1966.26 This law made the dis-
closure of bank information a criminal offense · subject to sanc-
tions. 26 In 1976, the law was broadened to protect all business 
information, yet it also provided exceptions to secrecy require-
ments that allowed access through the consent of the customer or 
22. The Swiss base their banking and business secrecy laws on three legal principles: 
the Civil Code's right to personal privacy; the confidentiality of the contractual relationship 
between a bank and its customer, found in the Code of Obligations; and criminal liability for 
violating the secrecy found in the federal banking laws. See Frei, Swiss Secrecy Laws and 
Obtaining Evidence From Switzerland, in 1 TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACTICAL AP-
PROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND ACCOMMODATIONS 1, 6 (1984). 
23. CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, supra note 14, at 33. 
24. Id. This list includes the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Channel Is-
lands, Hong Kong, Leichtenstein, the Netherlands (including the Netherlands Antilles), 
Panama, Switzerland and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Id. at 33-34. 
25. Banking and Trust Law of 1966, § 10, reprinted in CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 77. 
26. Id. 
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an order of the haven's proper authority. 27 
The Cayman Islands secrecy laws have contributed largely to 
the colony's rapid growth as an international financial center.28 
Other reasons for this development include the absence of income, 
corporate or property taxes, a stable political environment and re-
liable transportation and communications services. 29 Also, the ab-
sence of government disclosure of tax information with other coun-
tries and the abolition of all exchange controls has created a 
currency-free port.30 
All of these elements in the Cayman Islands and other secrecy 
havens have been conducive to drug traffickers looking for more 
sophisticated and effective methods of laundering their illegal 
gains. 31 Since secrecy laws have allowed traffickers to escape prose-
cution and develop their intricate methods of laundering, very lit-
tle is known about "the economics of the drug trade, "32 or the in-
tricate process called money laundering. 33 
Basic laundering techniques, however, have remained consis-
tent. 34 A trafficker first opens an account in a secrecy haven or, if 
the haven's law allows, the trafficker will form an exempt company 
and open an account in its name. H Once the account is open, the 
trafficker must find a way to smuggle the drug-related cash out of 
the United States, without creating a paper trail that would link 
him to the illicit money or to the laundering process itself. 36 The 
crudest way to accomplish this is to physically and surreptitiously 
27. Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law § 3 (1976), as amended by Act of 
1979, reprinted in CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, supra note 14, at 78-79. 
28. In 1964, the Cayman Islands had only a few banks and no offshore businesses. 
CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, supra note 14, at 30. By 1984, there were 450 banks and 18,000 
corporations. Id. at 76. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. These conditions are characteristic of the major secrecy havens throughout the 
world. Id. 
31. See generally Drug Barons Hide Billions, Boston Globe, Sept. 22, 1985, at 1, col. 1. 
One drug trafficker who maintained accounts in the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands con-
fessed at his 1981 sentencing hearing that he had "a lot of ideas" on how to move money 
into Liechtenstein corporations as well as the Philippines, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singa-
pore. "[T]his was what I was going to do ... I was going to send the money out." Id. at 25, 
col. 1. 
32. Strasser, supra note 6, at 46. 
33. Drug Barons Hide Billions, supra note 31, at 1. 
34. CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, supra note 14, at 17. 
35. Comment, supra note 10, at 139. This second procedure provides another layer of 
secrecy if the haven's laws provide for anonymity for the corporation's owners (or allows 
bearer stock companies). Id. 
36. Id. 
5
Grilli: Preventing Billions from being Washed Offshore: a Growing Approac
Published by SURFACE, 1987
70 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 14:65 
transport the cash out of the haven by plane past U.S. customs 
officials. 37 Another way to get the money out is to deliver the cur-
rency to a domestic bank, to be electronically transferred to the 
offshore bank account. 38 
Another more sophisticated method includes "structuring" a 
transaction.39 In order to reduce the large volume of cash, a traf-
ficker hires one or more people to run to different banks to buy 
cashier's checks for less than $10,000, so as not to trigger the 
banks' reporting duties under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA):'0 The 
checks can then be easily transported to the havens and deposited 
into secret accounts, safely beyond the reach of U.S. 
investigators. 41 
B. U.S. LEGISLATION TO STOP MONEY LAUNDERING 
The BSA was enacted as the first major attack on the practice 
of money laundering.42 It took the U.S. Government 10 years, how-
ever, to properly enforce the reporting requirements on domestic 
banks.43 Therefore, it was not until the early 1980's that U.S. 
37. Drug Barons Hide Billions, supra note 31, at 24. One trafficker perfected a tech-
nique where his male couriers wore women's pantyhose, stuffed with bundles of cash, and 
then put regular clothes over the hose. Id. 
38. Comment, supra note 10, at 139-40. 
39. This activity is also called "smurfing" and the runners involved are smurfs. Money 
Laundering Hearings, supra note 6, at 179 (statement of Richard C. Wassenaar, Internal 
Revenue Service, Assistant Commissioner, Criminal Investigations). 
40. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1983), as supplemented by 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1984), 
amended by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. ConE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2135 [hereinafter BSA]; see also Money Laundering Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 179 (statement of Richard C. Wassenaar). 
The BSA requires financial institutions to file a Currency Transaction Report for every 
cash transaction above $10,000. BSA, 31 U.S.C. § 5313. It also has filing requirements when-
ever someone takes more than $10,000 into or out of the United States. Id. § 5316. Violation 
of these requirements invokes civil and criminal penalties. Id. §§ 5321, 5322. While the stat-
ute has been used as an important tool to combat money laundering, there are some limiting 
factors. See infra text accompanying notes 43-47. For a detailed description of smurfing 
activities, see Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 6, at 79 (statement of of Herb Fried-
berg, former money launderer). 
41. Weiland, supra note 15, at 1116. A further step in effectively escaping detection is 
to set up accounts in a number of havens, and then "filter" or "cycle" the money through 
the different accounts. Id. The trafficker is then free to move the money back into the 
United States under the guise of a legitimate investment such as purchasing real estate, or 
as a loan to him from the foreign corporation or bank. He may even pay the loan back with 
interest and illegally deduct the interest on his U.S. tax return statement. Comment, supra 
note 10, at 140. 
42. Comment, supra note 10, at 140. 
43. See U.S. Failing to Catch Dirty Cash, Boston Globe, Sept. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1. 
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banks substantially responded to the act's requirements.44 This im-
provement was due to the U.S. Government following up on BSA 
violations and publicly exposing the fact that banks' failures to 
comply with the act allowed organized criminals to easily launder 
millions of dollars. 46 
There were other weaknesses in the act which proved trouble-
some. The act placed reporting duties on the domestic financial 
institution, not the customer who was the actual launderer.46 Up 
until 1986, a person who engaged in structuring activities to pre-
vent the bank from filing a report generally was not considered 
guilty of any illegal conduct.47 This lack of liability, along with a 
legitimate concern for their customers' rights to financial privacy, 
resulted in many, but by no means most, U.S. banks not asking 
questions when customers came in on a regular basis with huge 
amounts of cash to buy cashier's checks just under $10,000. Many 
banks did not even file currency reports for transactions over 
$10,000.48 
These limitations of the BSA, and a need to place blame 
where blame is due, prompted Congress to pass the Money Laun-
dering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA),49 which makes money laun-
44. Id. "[S]ince 1980 bank compliance in reporting cash transactions has jumped from 
about 10 % to 80 or 903 ." See also Thornton, Anticrime Attack Pays Dividends, Wash. 
Post, May 24, 1985, at E2. 
45. "[T]he Bank of Boston was fined $500,000 after pleading guilty to failing to report 
$1.22 billion in cash transactions with foreign banks - some for companies owned by a local 
Mafia family." Thornton, supra note 44, at E7. By November, 1986, 33 institutions and 34 
bank officers and employees had been prosecuted. Strasser, supra note 6, at 46; see also 
United States v. Bank of New England, No. 86-1334, slip op. (1st Cir. June 10, 1987) (where 
the Bank of New England lost on appeal from a conviction of 31 violations of the BSA). 
46. Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 6, at 180 (statement of Richard C. 
Wassenaar). 
47. See United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985); United St~tes v. 
Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 
1986). These cases held that "smurfing, at least if conducted at different banks on the same 
day, or at the same bank on different days, is not a crime" under the BSA. Money Launder-
ing Hearings, supra note 6, at 179; see also United States v. Reinis, 794 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 
1986). In Reinis, a cash withdrawal exceeding $10,000, effected by the purchase of several 
cashier's checks from the same bank, on the same day, but at different times, by several 
agents of the defendant, was held not reportable since there was no single transfer of funds 
exceeding $10,000 to either agent. But cf. Bank of New England, where the court held that 
it was a violation of the BSA to fail to report a transaction where a customer visited the 
same branch of the same bank once on the same day to present to a single bank teller two to 
four checks. All of the checks were made payable to cash, "for varying amounts under 
$10,000 which, when added together, equalled a sum greater than $10,000." Id. 
48. Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 6, at 98-99 (statement of Herb Friedberg, 
former money launderer). 
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1986) (MLCA). 
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dering a separate federal offense.60 Basically, the law prohibits any-
one from engaging in a financial transaction involving proceeds 
from an unlawful activity with the intent to promote that activity, 
conceal the illegal source of the funds, or evade the BSA reporting 
requirements. 61 In addition to serious civil and criminal sanc-
tions, 62 the MLCA also authorizes the seizure and forfeiture of the 
funds or property derived from criminal activity.63 
The MLCA also amends the BSA to eliminate one of the 
BSA's flaws. The amendment prohibits any person from structur-
ing a transaction so as to cause a domestic financial institution not 
to file a currency report.64 In this way, the law preempts previous 
case law66 by placing liability on the actor with the genuine crimi-
nal intent. 
The MLCA also makes it a crime to transport out of the 
United States funds or monetary instruments knowingly obtained 
from an illegal activity or intended for use in an illegal activity. 66 
Section 1956(a)(2) is aimed at stopping the process of money laun-
dering through offshore havens. Yet, its effectiveness is questiona-
ble given the creative and successful methods launderers use to 
move the money out of the country.67 
While the major effects of the MLCA on money laundering 
remain to be seen, they should help investigators establish the 
United States as an unaccommodating place to launder illegal 
money, especially for drug traffickers. In order to prove that a de-
fendant violated the MLCA in moving the money offshore, investi-
gators will need sufficient information regarding complex launder-
ing schemes and documentary evidence, that will be admissible in 
court, proving that the illegal transactions took place and that the 
50. See generally Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 6. This law seems closer to 
serving the goals of law enforcement officials. "[A]n analogy might be that if there were [sic] 
no federal crime for armed robbery of a bank, then you force ... prosecutors to use ... a 
violation of failure to register a weapon, when the real crime is robbing the bank." Id. at 
127. 
51. MLCA, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l). 
52. The civil penalties are either $10,000 or the value of the property or funds involved. 
Id. § 1956(b). The criminal sanctions are $500,000 or twice the value of the transaction and 
up to 20 years in prison. Id. § 1956 (a)(l)-(2). 
53. Id. §§ 981-982. This provision if enforced properly should prove crippling to drug 
trafficking operations. See id. § 1956. 
54. 31 u.s.c. § 5324 (1986). 
55. See supra note 47. 
56. MLCA, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2). 
57. Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Federal Money Laundering Offense, 22 
STAN. J. INT'L L. 389, 393 (1986); see supra note 37. 
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accounts do exist. 58 The new money laundering law expressly pro-
vides extraterritorial jurisdiction over illegal money laundering 
schemes that occur in part in the United States or are conducted 
by a U.S. citizen and exceed $10,000 in value.59 This provision, 
while helpful to U.S. investigators, comes into direct conflict with 
the secrecy laws of foreign jurisdictions. Therefore, in tracking to-
day's trafficker/launderer, an effective yet legal approach to extra-
territorial investigations of secret bank records is more important 
than ever. 
III. THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL APPROACHES TO OB-
TAINING FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM SECRECY 
HAVENS 
The need for extraterritorial investigation and prosecution of 
criminal matters is becoming a crucial area in the development of 
international law because of the changing nature of crime. Once 
considered a local problem dealt with by individual state laws, 
crime has broadened into a federal and, increasingly, an interna-
tional problem.60 Especially in the case of drug money laundering, 
the international financial community is extensively utilized by 
traffickers to escape detection under domestic law.61 
The previous section discussed the development of U.S. law 
regarding money laundering, which lead to a need for extraterrito-
58. CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, supra note 14, at 16. 
59. There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this section if: 
(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a non-United 
States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States; and 
(2) the transaction or series of related transactions involves funds or monetary 
instruments of a value exceeding $10,000. 
MLCA, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f). It has been suggested that the "in part" language of this provi-
sion covers a transaction involving only foreign banks and foreign nationals where the for-
eign national wires funds from one foreign bank location to another via the United States. 
See Note, supra note 57, at 396. But see infra note 93. 
60. Olsen, An Overview of the Use of the Compulsory Process by Federal Agencies to 
Gather Evidence in Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Cases - Bank of Nova Scotia, 
Marc Rich, Toyota Motor Corp, and Banca Della Svizzera Italiana Examined, in 1 TRANS-
NATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND AccOMODATIONS 77 4, 776-77 
(1984). 
As an illustration of the increasing international scope of criminal activities, consider 
that in the 1960's, the annual number of extradition requests received by the United States 
seldom exceeded 20; by 1978 this number was approximately 100; and in 1982 the United 
States received over 330 requests. Id. 
61. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Sophisticated criminals know that put-
ting evidence abroad makes it more difficult for U.S. officials to obtain it. Chamblee, Inter-
national Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases, in 1 TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACTICAL 
APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND AccOMODATIONS 191, 192 (1984). 
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rial reach by U.S. investigators to track down and stop the laun-
dering flow. This section will briefly describe the past approaches 
taken by the United States to obtain financial information regard-
ing laundering in secrecy havens. These approaches can be divided 
into two categories: the traditional methods of judicial assistance 
in the form of letters rogatory or comity and, the more controver-
sial, unilateral methods of compelled consent and grand jury sub-
poena enforcement. 
A. THE USE OF JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE THROUGH LETTERS ROGATORY 
Historically there were two types of international mutual as-
sistance for criminal matters: extradition and "other" judicial as-
sistance.62 This "other" type of assistance, which included sum-
moning witnesses to testify, serving documents, conducting search 
and seizures, and producing information or evidence, is provided 
through the formalized procedure of letters rogatory.63 A letter ro-
gatory is a request by a judicial officer in one country for the per-
formance of a judicial act by a judge in another country.64 
It was not until 1964 that the United States passed legislation 
expressly permitting the Department of State to receive and trans-
mit letters rogatory in criminal cases. 66 Before 1964, judicial assis-
tance developed reluctantly in the United States as well as in other 
countries mainly because of the conflict of laws rule, that the crim-
inal law of one nation will not give effect to the criminal law of 
another.66 This reluctance began to give way to the growing need 
for evidence abroad. 67 
Letters rogatory, however, have grown into a "cumbersome 
and time-consuming process. "68 They usually present problems in 
drafting and interpretation because the letters are written by 
62. Grutzner, International Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 
in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: JURISDICTION AND COOPERATION 189, 196 
(M. Bassiouni ed. 1973). 
63. Chamblee, supra note 61, at 215. 
64. Id. at 212. 
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976). "(a) The Department of State has power, directly, or 
through suitable channels: (1) to receive a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a 
foreign or international tribunal, to transmit it to the tribunal, officer, or agency in the 
United States to whom it is addressed, and to receive and return it after execution ... . " 
Id. 
66. See generally The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); Ellis & Pisani, The 
United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 19 INT'L L . 189, 197-98 (1985). 
67. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
68. Ellis & Pisani, supra note 66, at 189. 
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judges familiar with their own legal vernacular, but not that of the 
foreign jurisdiction receiving the request.69 The process of using 
letters rogatory is time-consuming because the letters must be de-
livered through diplomatic channels.70 Using letters rogatory also 
require~ the costly services of foreign counsel to represent the Re-
questing State before the Requested State's judicial proceeding. 71 
An important limitation regarding letters rogatory is that ma-
jor jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, the Bahamas and 
the Cayman Islands, only allow such judicial assistance for trial 
purposes but not for investigations. 72 This could hinder an investi-
gation into money laundering activities where evidence of foreign 
accounts is crucial to obtaining an indictment. 
B. U.S. UNILATERAL APPLICATION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDIC-
TION TO OBTAIN FINANCIAL RECORDS FROM FOREIGN SECRECY HAVENS 
Due to the inefficiency and lack of effect that U.S. prosecutors 
have had with judicial assistance in the form of letters rogatory, 
the Justice Department has sought unilateral methods to obtain 
vital financial evidence from secrecy havens. One method has been 
an attempt to comply with secrecy laws that allow disclosure of 
banking information when the client signs a consent to release 
form. The other method, which has proven effective but very con-
troversial, is enforcement of a U.S. grand jury subpoena on the for-
eign bank to produce the required information. 
1. Compelled Consent 
In many instances, prosecutors have attempted to obtain fi-
nancial information by compelling a defendant, or a person whose 
records are being investigated, to sign a consent to release form. 73 
Normally, under secrecy haven laws, this is a legitimate form of 
disclosure. 74 However, many secrecy jurisdictions consider such a 
consent invalid when it is compelled or given under protest. 76 
69. Chamblee, supra note 61, at 217. 
70. Id. 
71. Olsen, supra note 60, at 781. 
72. See id. at 792. 
73. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2nd Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245 
(N.D.N.Y. 1985). 
74. See The Cayman Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (Law 16 of 1976), 
amended by Law 26 of 1979, § 3. 
75. This is true in Switzerland. See Frei, supra note 22, at 11; see also Alexander Wins 
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In practical application, the method of compelled consent re-
quires the suspect to be aware of the government's investigation 
and/or be under the government's control. This is not a problem 
when the suspect has been indicted by a grand jury, but it does 
present difficulties when the information is needed during the in-
vestigation phase to get the indictment,76 especially when the in-
vestigation must be kept confidential. 
Another time-consuming and costly problem occurs when the 
suspect or defendant raises a fifth amendment defense. The North-
ern District of New York, as well as the Eleventh Circuit, have 
struck down this defense.77 In United States v. Ghidoni,78 the 
court held that the directive was not self-incriminating, because it 
was carefully worded so as not to form a testimonial admission by 
the defendant of the records' existence, authenticity, or the de-
fendant's control over the records.79 
Conversely, at least one district court has upheld a fifth 
amendment challenge when there was no indictment of the sus-
pect. In In re Doe,80 contrary to Ghidoni, the court held that by 
compelling the suspect to sign the consent, the existence of and 
control over the accounts would necessarily be admitted; therefore, 
the suspect would be providing the government with the incrimi-
nating link it needed to secure an indictment. 81 This disagreement 
among the courts, combined with the cost and time spent in liti-
gating a fifth amendment challenge, and some havens' refusal to 
honor a consent given under protest, limits the compelled consent 
method as an effective investigative tool. 
2. Enforcement of Grand Jury Subpoenas 
The most controversial method used by U.S. prosecutors to 
apply extraterritorial jurisdiction over secrecy havens has been the 
enforcement of grand jury subpoenas on banks in foreign jurisdic-
Right to Protest Bank Accounts Probe, Syracuse Post-Standard, Feb. 5, 1987, at 1. On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ex-mayor of Syracuse could not be 
forced to authorize the release of information regarding his Panamanian bank accounts un-
less the banks were aware of the compulsion. United States prosecutors fear that the foreign 
banks will not honor a compelled consent form. This ruling could "hinder the government's 
attempts to locate and seize assets .... " Id. 
76. See In re Doe, 599 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Tex. 1984). 
77. See Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 818; Browne, 624 F. Supp. at 248. 
78. 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1984). 
79. Id. at 818. 
80. 599 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Tex. 1984). 
81. Id. at 748. 
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tions. This method, while it is supported by U.S. courts and has 
proven effective for prosecutors, has also hurt U.S. relations with 
countries such as the Bahamas and Canada. 82 
In United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia (Nova Scotia /),83 a 
grand jury subpoena duces tecum was served on the Miami branch 
of the Bank of Nova Scotia, a Canadian-chartered bank, during an 
investigation into tax evasion and drug trafficking charges. 84 The 
subpoena called for the production of banking records from the 
bank's branches in the Bahamas and Antigua.86 The bank refused 
to comply with the subpoena's request for bank records, on the 
ground that it would be a violation of Bahamian bank secrecy 
laws. 86 On appeal, the district court's order to comply was affirmed 
based on the balancing test contained in the Restatement (Second) 
of Foreign Relations Law.87 The court held that the importance of 
a U.S. grand jury criminal investigation outweighed a secrecy ha-
ven's interest in protecting financial privacy through its laws.88 
In 1983, the Bank of Nova Scotia was served with another 
subpoena demanding the production of financial documents from 
branches in the Bahamas, Antigua, and the Cayman Islands. 89 The 
appeals court, in Nova Scotia II, included a discussion of the 
bank's nationality in its application of the balancing test used in 
Nova Scotia l.90 Since the bank chose to conduct widespread busi-
ness in the United States, it could not hide behind its Canadian 
nationality in order to escape U.S. jurisdiction and laws. 91 There-
fore, the enforcement of the subpoena was valid. 92 
While the defendant bank in both cases was forced to comply 
with the subpoenas, the court's holdings were limited to institu-
tions with branch offices in the United States.93 When the records 
82. See CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, supra note 14, at 67-70; Money Laundering Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 815. 
83. 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (Nova Scotia I). 
84. Id. at 1386. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965). 
88. Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1391. 
89. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F .2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984) (Nova Scotia 
II). 
90. Id. at 829. 
91. Id. at 828. 
92. Id. at 829. 
93. Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 6, at 186 (statement of Richard C. Was-
senaar). Also, while the government prosecutors won, the process of obtaining the informa-
tion was extremely costly and time-consuming. Id. 
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are located in foreign banks that have no substantial U.S. contacts, 
summonses a:q.d subpoenas are in~ffective in breaking through the 
wall of secrecy.94 This restriction is a frustrating problem for pros-
ecutors in money laundering investigations since many launderers 
can simply set up accounts in banks with no U.S. branches.9~ 
The practice of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction through the 
unilateral enforcement of the grand jury subpoena could have 
more long-term and serious consequences. Foreign jurisdictions 
have objected strongly to the United States exercise of judicial au-
thority in their territories, claiming that such an approach is a vio-
lation of national and territorial sovereignty.96 The objecting juris-
dictions have reacted by enforcing strong blocking statutes against 
foreign investigators. 97 
The Cayman Islands poses a typical example of the kind of 
response aggressive U.S. prosecutors should expect. In 1976, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Field,98 af-
firmed contempt sanctions against a non-resident Cayman Islands 
banker who was served with a subpoena while in the United 
States. 99 The banker had refused to testify about certain bank ac-
counts, claiming that doing so could subject him to criminal prose-
cution in the Cayman Islands. 100 The court, in applying a balancing 
test between the banker's probable prosecution in the Cayman Is-
lands and the United States interest in enforcing a grand jury sub-
poena, rejected the defense and held the banker in contempt.101 In 
response to this ruling, the Cayman Islands legislature passed the 
94. Id. at 190. 
95. The MLCA, however, does provide extraterritorial jurisdiction to cover conduct 
committed, in part, outside the United States. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
The degree to which the MLCA can be enforced against transactions with "purely" foreign 
banks will depend, however, on how the courts interpret the Act. See Note, supra note 57, 
at 395. 
96. Frei, supra note 22, at 33. 
97. Shine, Transnational Litigation in Criminal Matters: A Case Study of the Inter-
conex Prosecution, in 1 TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS 
AND AccoMMODATIONS 533, 567 (1984). A blocking statute prohibits use of local procedures 
to disclose secret information to foreign authorities. See, e.g., Swiss Penal Code § 273, which 
states, "[a]ny person who ... makes a business or manufacturing secret available to foreign 
authorities, to foreign organizations, private business enterprises or to their agents, shall be 
punished by imprisonment, in serious cases by penal servitude. In addition to the imprison-
ment a fine can be imposed." 
98. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976). 
99. Id. at 410. 
100. Id. at 405. 
101. Id. at 407. 
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Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Act102 which strength-
ened and transformed the previous bank secrecy laws into all-en-
compassing business secrecy laws.103 
The unilateral enforcement of grand jury subpoenas can, 
therefore, eventually hinder the development of a transnational 
criminal enforcement system. When foreign jurisdictions raise 
claims of violations of sovereignty or strengthen the secrecy or 
blocking laws that the subpoenas are trying to break through, in-
ternational cooperation breaks down, and the drug trafficker/ 
money launderer is able to move more freely than ever to hide and 
clean his illegal profits.10• 
Realizing that this trend could irreparably harm relations be-
tween them, the United States and the Cayman Islands began to 
build a system of mutual assistance that culminated in the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLA T), 105 signed by the two countries in 
1986. While the treaty still requires ratification by both parties, it 
stands ready to become an effective tool for prosecutors as well as 
an important development in the series of MLAT's the United 
States has formed with other foreign jurisdictions. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES-CAYMAN ISLANDS TREATY 
ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AS A LEGAL APPROACH TO 
OBTAINING FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM SECRECY 
HAVENS 
In the past few years, the Justice Department, realizing the 
need for cooperation in transnational criminal litigation, has made 
the development of MLAT's and similar executive agreements in-
volving criminal matters, one of its top priorities, especially in its 
war on drugs. 106 The MLAT's make up a growing series of bilateral 
agreements into which the United States has entered with other 
countries, obligating the parties to cooperate with each other in 
102. See The Cayman Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (Law 16 of 1976), 
amended by Law 26 of 1979, § 3. 
103. CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, supra note 14, at 50. 
104. Sophisticated criminals know that putting evidence abroad (a prime example is 
laundering illegally-obtained money in offshore banks) makes it more difficult for U.S. law 
enforcement officials to use it against them. Chamblee, supra note 61, at 192. 
105. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21. 
106. Strasser, supra note 6, at 47; Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 6, at 805. 
In the field of international drug enforcement, MLAT's are "our highest priorities." Money 
Laundering Hearings, supra note 6, at 814 (statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Criminal Division, Justice Dep't). 
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carrying out criminal investigations and prosecutions. 107 The most 
common form of mutual assistance involves gathering evidence in a 
foreign country, usually through judicial orders, search and seizure 
orders, service of process or even arrests of suspects. 108 
At the moment, the United States has MLAT's for criminal 
matters in force with Switzerland,109 Turkey,110 the Netherlands, 
including Netherlands Antilles, m and Italy.112 There are similar 
MLAT's signed but not yet in force, with Columbia, 113 Morocco, 114 
Canada,115 Thailand116 and the Cayman Islands.117 Treaties with 
West Germany and Jamaica are being negotiated, 118 and plans for 
negotiations with Nigeria, a major route for heroin trafficking and 
money laundering, have been recently announced.119 
The Cayman Islands Treaty (Treaty), the newest of the signed 
MLAT's, was developed from a narrower executive agreement be-
tween the United States and the Cayman Islands covering drug-
related crimes only.120 The agreement, signed on July 26, 1984, of-
107. TREATY ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE WITH THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, 
S. REP. No. 36, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981). 
108. Chamblee, supra note 61, at 191-93. 
109. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.l.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter Swiss Treaty]. 
110. Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, 
United States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.1.A.S. No. 9891. 
111. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, June 12, 
1981, United States-Netherlands, _ U.S.T. _, T.l.A.S. No. 10734 [hereinafter Nether-
lands Treaty]. 
112. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, United States-
Italy, _ U.S.T. _, T.l.A.S. No. _ (entered into force Nov. 13, 1985) [hereinafter 
Italian Treaty]. 
113. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Aug. 20, 1980, United States-
Columbia, _ U.S.T. _, T.l.A.S. No. _ (approved by the Senate on Jan. 4, 1982; not 
yet in force) [hereinafter Columbian Treaty]. 
114. Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Oct. 17, 1983, United 
States-Morocco, _ U.S.T. _, T.l.A.S. No. _ (advice and consent of the U.S. Senate 
given on June 29, 1984; not yet in force) [hereinafter Moroccan Treaty]. 
115. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, March 18, 1985, United 
States-Canada, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1092-99 (No. 4, July 1985). 
116. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, March 19, 1986, United States-Thailand,_ 
U.S.T. _, T.l.A.S. No. _ (not yet in force). 
117. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21. 
118. Telephone interview with James Springer, Staff Attorney, Tax Div., Justice Dep't 
(Jan. 9, 1987). 
119. Shultz Raises Heroin Issue in Nigeria, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at A3, col. 3. 
120. Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America, Con-
cerning the Cayman Islands and Matters Connected With, Arising From, Related to, or Re-
sulting From Any Narcotics Activity Referred to in the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs (1961), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1110-18 (July 1985) [hereinafter Executive Agreement]. 
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fered an effective alternative to the approach epitomized by the 
Nova Scotia cases, at least for drug-related crimes.121 
In the 15 months of its limited existence, the agreement essen-
tially provided for a procedure whereby the U.S. Attorney General 
could sign a request certificate to the Cayman Islands Attorney 
General, listing the drug-related financial documents needed.122 
The Cayman Islands Attorney General could then issue a notice 
requiring production of the documents in a timely fashion. 123 The 
agreement also called for negotiations for a more comprehensive 
mutual assistance treaty should the agreement prove 
satisfactory.124 
On July 3, 1986, such a treaty was signed.m While the agree-
ment had provided a binding diplomatic approach to mutual assis-
tance, the Treaty will create a binding legal approach to mutual 
assistance in the area of gathering criminal evidence located in for-
eign secrecy jurisdictions. 
The Treaty provides for assistance to be given in the forms of 
producing documents and records, serving documents, locating 
persons, executing search and seizure requests, freezing criminally 
obtained assets, and facilitating proceedings for forfeiture, restitu-
tion and collection of fines. 126 In comparison to the other MLAT's, 
the Treaty provides the most comprehensive assistance. It also in-
cludes provisions regarding forfeiture and immobilization of assets 
that were considered innovations in other treaties. 127 
As in all of the other MLAT's regarding criminal matters, the 
Treaty establishes an obligation to provide mutual assistance not 
only for criminal prosecutions, but also for investigations. 128 As 
A similar agreement with Turkey and the Caicos Islands was signed on Sept. 18, 1986 and is 
in place. See BULL. OF LEGAL DEV. 175 (No. 16, Sept. 29, 1986). 
121. Ironically, one of the reasons for the successful negotiation for the Cayman Islands 
agreement, and later the treaty, is the United States unilateral actions in the Nova Scotia 
cases in enforcing grand jury subpoenas. Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 6, at 815-
16. Foregoing the enforcement of the grand jury subpoenas for documents covered by the 
Executive Agreement, and later the treaty, was a major concession by the United States. 
See CRIME AND SECRECY REPORT, supra note 14, at 83-84. 
122. Executive Agreement, supra note 120, art. 3.1.ii. 
123. Id. art. 3.2.a. Provisions were also made for authentication of testimony regarding 
the documents. Id. art. 4. 
124. Id. art. 7. The Executive Agreement lead to 65 indictments and $15 million in 
forfeiture in the 15 months of its existence. Strasser, supra note 6, at 47. 
125. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21. 
126. Id. art. 1(2). 
127. MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE WITH ITALY, S. REP. No. 36, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 
(1984) [hereinafter ITALIAN REPORT]; see infra note 151. 
128. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 1(1). 
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stated before, evidence of foreign bank accounts will be crucial in 
the investigatory phase regarding money laundering charges. 
Essentially, the Treaty sets up a central authority in each 
country empowering them to make and receive requests for assis-
tance.129 Article 4 defines, in a straightforward manner, the stan-
dard form and content of the requests, 130 and Article 5 provides for 
the timely execution of such requests by the authority having the 
proper jurisdiction in the Requested State.131 
Article 8 of the Treaty allows the United States to have access 
to secret bank records in the same capacity as Cayman authorities 
would under Cayman Islands law.132 The Treaty, therefore, does 
away with the need to unilaterally enforce a grand jury subpoena 
duces tecum on a foreign bank when the offense is covered by the 
Treaty. Article 8(5) also provides for authentication of the foreign 
documents in the Requested State so as to comply with the au-
thenticating procedures established in Rule 902(3) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.183 
The first question to ask when applying the Treaty is whether 
the criminal offense at issue is covered by it. One of the definitions 
of a "criminal offense" in article 19(3) is dual criminality: "any 
conduct punishable by more than one year's imprisonment under 
129. Id. art. 2. This is common to all the other MLAT's. The central authority in the 
Requested State not only represents the Requesting State in the Requested State, it also 
determines if the request should be denied under article 3 of the treaty. Denial of assistance 
is mandatory if the underlying offense is tax-related, with an exception made for tax fraud. 
Id. art. 3(1)(a). 
130. According to article 4, the requests must be submitted in writing and must include 
the following information: name of the Requesting State's authority to whom the request 
relates (art. 4, (2)(a)) ; the subject matter, including the criminal offenses and purpose that 
gave rise to the request (art. 4, (2)(b), (f)); the names, birthdates and addresses of persons 
involved (art. 4, (2)(c)); any information supporting the request (art. 4, (2)(d)); a description 
of the evidence or information sought (art. 4, (2)(e)); and identity of any person from whom 
evidence is sought (art. 4, (2)(g)). 
131. "The Central Authority of the Requested Party shall promptly execute any re-
quest or, when appropriate, shall transmit it to the authority having jurisdiction to do so. 
The competent authorities of the Requested Party shall do everything in their power to 
execute the request." Id. art. 5(1) (emphasis added). 
132. "A person requested to testify or to produce documentary information or articles 
in the territory of the Requested Party may be compelled to do so in accordance with the 
requirements of the law of the Requested Party." Id. art. 8(1). "This obligation is consistent 
with the treaty's basic requirement that the Requested State follow the same practices and 
procedures in executing a request for assistance as it normally follows in domestic investiga-
tions or proceedings of similar gravity." MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY WITH THE RE-
PUBLIC OF COLUMBIA, S. REP. No. 35, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981) [hereinafter COLUMBIAN 
REPORT). 
133. Id. 
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the laws of both ... Parties."134 In the Swiss Treaty on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, this requirement has caused frus-
trating problems for U.S. prosecutors involved with insider trading 
violations.136 However, most of the later MLAT's have not required 
dual criminality for the granting of mutual assistance. 136 
Article 19(3)(C) defines other activities that may not be crimes 
in both states but are still covered by the Treaty. These include 
any offenses or civil or administrative proceedings relating to drug 
trafficking, 137 and any willful failure to report an international 
transfer of currency or any currency transaction connected with 
the unlawful proceeds of any criminal offense.138 This is a direct 
reference to the BSA and its reporting requirements to stop money 
launderers. Exempting this offense from the dual criminality re-
quirement is beneficial to law enforcement officials, since BSA vio-
lations are not considered crimes in other countries. 
The wording of section 19(3)(c) could also be interpreted to 
cover the offense of money laundering, since such an offense is ba-
sically defined as a financial transaction connected with unlawful 
proceeds of a criminal activity.139 If such an interpretation of the 
Treaty proves problematic, U.S. law enforcement officials can look 
to the broad language of article 19(3)(C) regarding drug offenses.140 
If a money laundering investigation or indictment can be con-
nected with illegal drug activities, then it should fall under this 
section. Since the Treaty is a result of the success achieved under 
the executive agreement on drug-related offenses, broad interpre-
tation of article 19, relating to drug money laundering activities, 
would be consistent with one of the original purposes of the 
134. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 19(3)(a) (emphasis added). Dual crimi-
nality is usually a standard requirement in extradition treaties. See COLUMBIAN REPORT, 
supra note 132, at 3. 
135. See Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1983). 
136. See, e.g., Italian Treaty, supra note 112; Moroccan Treaty, supra note 114; Colum-
bian Treaty, supra note 113. 
137. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 19(3)(c). "'Narcotics trafficking' ... 
means all offenses or ancillary civil or administrative proceedings taken by either of the 
Parties or their agencies connected with, arising from, related to, or resulting from any nar-
cotics activity covered by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961." Id. 
Id. 
138. See id. art. 19(3)(f). It is defined as: 
[W]illfully or dishonestly failing to make to the Government a report which is re-
quired by law to be made to it in respect of an international transfer of currency or 
other financial transactions connected with, arising from, or related to the unlawful 
proceeds of an criminal offense falling with [sic] any provision of this Article. 
139. MLCA, 18 U.S.C. § 1956. 
140. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 19(3)(c); see supra note 136. 
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Treaty. 
The Treaty has other provisions which expressly facilitate mu-
tual cooperation in combatting the trafficking/laundering system. 
Article 1 provides that mutual assistance will be given only for civil 
and administrative proceedings that are drug-related, while the 
other MLAT's generally allow assistance for all civil and adminis-
trative investigations and proceedings.141 By making a drug-related 
limitation on this type of assistance, the Treaty actually retains 
the major purpose of the other MLAT's similar provisions - shar-
ing information on the activities of suspected drug traffickers. 142 
Article 16(1) allows for an exchange of information regarding 
criminally derived proceeds located in the other party's territory.143 
This could be very beneficial to investigators trying to follow com-
plex laundering schemes. Article 16(2) imposes an obligation on 
both parties to assist in the forfeiture of illegal proceeds and the 
collection of criminally imposed fines. 144 These provisions, there-
fore, not only allow the United States to bypass the wall of secrecy 
in the Cayman Islands to determine the volume of laundered pro-
ceeds, they also aid law enforcement officials in effectively depriv-
ing a major trafficker of those proceeds. 
V. A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 
TREATY AND OTHER METHODS TO OBTAIN FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION FROM SECRECY HAVENS 
By comparing the characteristics of the three approaches, the 
MLAT's, as exemplified by the Cayman Islands Treaty,_ are the 
most rational and practical legal approach. 
A. PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF THE TREATY OvER LETTERS RoGATORY 
AND COMPELLED CONSENT 
As stated previously, letters rogatory are usually very difficult 
to draft, translate and interpret because they are written by a 
141. See Columbian Treaty, supra note 113, art. 1(1); Italian Treaty, supra note 112, 
arts. 1(2), 8(3); Moroccan Treaty, supra note 114, art. 7(2); Swiss Treaty, supra note 109, 
art. 1(1). Cf. Netherlands Treaty, supra note 111. 
142. COLUMBIAN REPORT, supra note 132, at 1; see also Cayman Islands Treaty, supra 
note 21, art. 16(1). 
143. "The Central Authority of one Party may notify the Central Authority of the 
other Party when it has reason to believe that proceeds of a criminal offense are located in 
the territory of the other Party." Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 16(1). 
144. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 16(2)(a), (c). Also, article 1(2)(g) ex-
pressly provides for the immobilization of criminally derived assets. 
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judge who is familiar with his own legal vernacular but not that of 
a foreign jurisdiction.146 The formulation of a letter becomes a 
costly endeavor where the utmost care and skill must be employed. 
The Treaty, however, provides that a straightforward and standard 
form be used to make requests for specific pieces of evidence or 
information.146 
The process of delivering letters rogatory is conducted through 
diplomatic channels and can be very slow.147 The Treaty 
designates one Central Authority in each country for receiving and 
processing requests from the other country.148 The authorities, 
usually the appropriate heads of justice ministries, are permitted 
to communicate directly with one another thereby curtailing delays 
and facilitating better understanding of the contents of the re-
quests.149 Letters rogatory also require the services of foreign coun-
sel.160 With the system of Central Authorities established in the 
MLAT's, the foreign governments directly represent each other in 
their respective jurisdictions, thus eradicating the need for expen-
sive foreign counsel.161 
In addition, jurisdictions will not honor letters rogatory that 
are sent for investigative purposes.152 Under the Treaty, assistance 
must be rendered not just for judicial proceedings but also for 
criminal investigations and administrative investigations and pro-
ceedings related to drugs. 163 This added assistance allows investi-
gators to build a stronger case for an indictment. 
Perhaps the most important improvement the MLAT's con-
tain over the more traditional letters rogatory is the concept of ob-
ligation rather than discretion. Once a letter rogatory reaches a 
foreign judge, he uses his discretion in deciding whether or not to 
145. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
146. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 4. 
147. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
148. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 2. 
149. ITALIAN REPORT, supra note 127, at 3. 
150. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
151. Olsen, supra note 60, at 781; see supra note 129. "The Central Authorities have 
the responsibility to insure that requests comply with the requirements of the Treaty, are 
executed promptly, and are returned promptly to the requesting country, together with the 
information and evidence obtained, upon execution by the competent authorities of the re-
quested country." ITALIAN REPORT, supra note 127, at 3. 
152. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
153. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 1. 
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honor it, 1 ~• a decision which is rarely appealable.166 On the other 
hand, the Treaty, as an agreement between two equal states, estab-
lishes a binding obligation on each party to honor the other party's 
properly submitted request.166 If there is any foreign litigation, the 
focus will be on interpreting the Treaty, not trying to persuade a 
foreign court to override a foreign judge's discretion. 
As mentioned before, the method of compelled consent has a 
major drawback - it requires the suspect to be under the govern-
ment's control and, therefore, be aware of an investigation against 
him.167 These limitations are avoided by the Treaty, since it re-
quires no action by the person under investigation. If an investiga-
tion is confidential or undercover, as many drug-related investiga-
tions are, article 7(3) allows the Requesting State to ask that the 
Requested State treat a request for assistance with 
confidentiality.1H 
The Treaty's design avoids the practical problems of both the 
letters rogatory and the compelled consent methods. Its stream-
lined procedures and binding quality will also facilitate the rela-
tions of the United States and the Cayman Islands under interna-
tional law and, thereby, reverse the consequences of the U.S. 
enforcement of grand jury subpoenas. 
B. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BENEFITS OF THE TREATY OVER EN-
FORCEMENT OF U.S. GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS 
The benefits of the Treaty over the grand jury subpoena are a 
mix of political and legal concerns. While the Nova Scotia cases 
154. Olsen, supra note 60, at 792. 
155. Id. But see United States v. Carver, No. 81-00342 (D.C. 1981), aff'd. sub nom. 
United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984) 
(where the Cayman Islands judge's decision to deny execution of a letter rogatory was re-
versed on appeal). 
156. Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 1(1): 
"The Parties shall provide mutual assistance, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, for the investigation, prosecution, and suppression of criminal offenses of the nature 
and in the circumstances set out in this Treaty, including the civil and administrative pro-
ceedings referred to in paragraph 3(c) of Article 19 [Narcotics Trafficking]." Id. 
Id. 
157. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
158. According to article 7(3), 
The Central Authority of the Requesting Party may request that the application for 
assistance, its contents and related documents, and the granting of assistance be 
kept confidential. If the request cannot be executed without breaking confidential-
ity, the Central Authority of the Requested Party shall so inform the Central Au-
thority of the Requesting Party which shall then determine whether the request 
should nevertheless be executed. 
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were successful in results, their long-term consequences could con-
siderably diminish their importance. Foreign countries will react 
either by negotiating for a treaty on cooperation such as the Cay-
man Islands did, or by imposing stronger secrecy or blocking stat-
utes, 169 making the wall of secrecy around their jurisdictions more 
impregnable - a situation most beneficial to the trafficker/laun-
derer. Countries have also raised the considerable claim that such 
subpoenas are violations of their sovereignty under international 
law.160 The United States justifies the enforcement approach 
through a balance of interests between the U.S. criminal justice 
system and the other country's privacy interests. 161 This balance of 
interests, however, leads to a disregard for another nation's laws. 
The Treaty, by creating an obligation to cooperate and then 
by providing a flexible and relatively simple system for the execu-
tion of assistance, replaces this balanced disregard with a respect 
for, and employment of, both countries' laws. The Cayman Islands 
wall of secrecy remains intact, but rather than a hole being crashed 
through, the wall now has a door that the United States can unlock 
when needed. 
The effect of the Treaty is limited, however, to only those of-
fenses it defines.162 Despite this, the Treaty remains a workable in-
strument because of article 19(3)(k). This provision allows the gov-
ernments of both parties to increase the number of offenses 
covered under the Treaty.163 
For drug trafficking and money laundering concerns, a second 
limitation is more troubling. The Treaty is limited to the United 
States and the Cayman Islands only. Once the Treaty with the 
Cayman Islands is in force, there is nothing to stop a launderer 
from shifting to a secrecy haven that does not have a treaty with 
the United States. This problem can only be solved by the devel-
opment of more treaties with other havens. This proposed system 
of bilateral agreements would then need to be interlocked thereby 
creating a network of obligation to grant mutual legal assistance 
159. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
160. Shine, supra note 9, at 566. 
161. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
162. A major concern of the United States regarding the use of secrecy havens is tax 
violations; the Cayman Islands Treaty, however, specifically exempts tax evasion other than 
fraud from its coverage. See Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 21, art. 3(1)(a). 
163. Under article 19(3)(k), "'Criminal offense' means: 
(k) such futher offenses as may from time to time be agreed upon by exchange of diplo-
matic notes between the United States and the United Kingdom, including the Cayman 
Islands." Id. art. 19(3)(k). 
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among the havens themselves. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For a drug trafficker, money is not only a prime motivation 
but it also operates as a vital form of security.164 Therefore, a traf-
ficker's need to launder these profits is his Achilles' heel. Due to 
the fact that U.S. laws on money laundering have recently been 
sharpened and strengthened, the United States is becoming a very 
unaccommodating place to store or launder illegal cash. The traf-
ficker, however, has learned to direct an entire global network of 
illegal operations by moving with anonymous ease through the in-
ternational community. 
MLAT's have become the newest weapon for investigators and 
prosecutors in tracking down illegal drug money. At the moment, 
there are a relatively small number of these treaties. These num-
bers, however, already have defied the gloomy predictions made a 
few years ago regarding the effectiveness of the treaties. 166 As the 
number of treaties grow, so will their effectiveness, because there 
will be fewer and fewer accommodating places for traffickers to 
clean their illicit cash without risking exposure. 
In a larger sense, the treaties are also creating an obligation to 
cooperate on an international level to fight criminal activities. This 
obligation could form a solid foundation upon which a system of 
international criminal justice can be built. International assistance, 
supplemented by strong local laws, could deliver the crushing blow 
in the war on drugs. 
Andrea M. Grilli 
164. See generally B. FREEMANTLE, supra note 5. 
165. See Weiland, supra note 15, at 1115-16. 
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